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Abstract Much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some
form of collateral: residential and commercial mortgages, corporate bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations are familiar
examples. This paper builds an extension of general equilibrium theory that
incorporates durable goods, collateralized securities and the possibility of
default to argue that the reliance on collateral to secure loans, the particular
collateral requirements (chosen by the social planner or by the market), and
the scarcity of collateral have a profound impact on prices, on allocations, on
the structure of markets, and especially on the eﬃciency of market outcomes.
Some of these ﬁndings provide useful insights into housing and mortgage
markets, and into the sub-prime mortgage market in particular.
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Recent events in ﬁnancial markets provide a sharp reminder that much of the
lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral: residential
and commercial mortgages are secured by the mortgaged property itself,
corporate bonds are secured by the physical assets of the ﬁrm, collateralized
mortgage obligations and debt obligations and other similar instruments are
secured by pools of loans that are in turn secured by physical property. The
total of such collateralized lending is enormous: in 2007, the value of U.S.
residential mortgages alone was roughly $10 trillion and the (notional) value
of collateralized debt obligations was estimated to exceed $50 trillion. The
reliance on collateral to secure loans is so familiar that it might be easy
to forget that it is a relatively recent innovation: extra-economic penalties
such as debtor’s prisons, indentured servitude, and even execution were in
widespread use in Western societies into the middle of the 19th Century.
Reliance on collateral to secure loans — rather than on extra-economic
penalties — avoids the moral and ethical issues of imposing penalties in the
event of bad luck, the cost of imposing penalties, and the diﬃculty of ﬁnding
the defaulter in order to impose penalties at all. Such penalties represent a
pure deadweight loss – to the borrower who defaults, to the lender who suﬀers
the default, and to society as a whole (and are often triggered by miscalcu-
lation rather than by deliberate eﬀort). Collateral, which simply transfers
resources from one owner to another, is intended to avoid this deadweight
loss. (In practice, seizure of collateral may involve deadweight losses of its
own.) This paper argues that the reliance on collateral to secure loans and
the particular levels of collateral chosen (by the government or by the mar-
ket) have a profound impact on prices, on allocations, on the structure of
ﬁnancial institutions, and especially on the eﬃciency of market outcomes.
Several eﬀects of collateral are perhaps the most important. The ﬁrst
and most obvious eﬀect is that collateral requirements limit borrowing. The
second, and more subtle eﬀect is that collateral requirements distort both
choices and prices. This distortion is reﬂected in the existence of some good
used as collateral and some buyer of that good who pays a price strictlyabove his/her marginal utility for consuming that good – so prices do not
equate marginal utilities of consumption. Thus, the equilibrium price of
each collateral good reﬂects both a consumption value and a collateral value,
reﬂecting what Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) term a liquidity wedge. (When
this distortion and liquidity wedge are absent, collateral equilibrium coincides
with general equilibrium with incomplete markets.) The third eﬀect is that
collateral requirements make it easier to borrow to buy goods but also increase
competition between borrowers for the very same goods; the net welfare eﬀects
are ambiguous.
Because diﬀerent collateral requirements may lead to diﬀerent equilibria,
it is natural to ask about optimal collateral requirements. It might seem that
society – or at least lenders – would prefer to set collateral requirements suf-
ﬁciently high that there will be no default. However, although high collateral
requirements make loans safer, they also inhibit borrowing – which may be
bad for lenders as well as for borrowers. As we show, collateral requirements
that lead to equilibrium default – even to crashes – with positive probabil-
ity may be Pareto optimal, and so might be chosen by a benevolent social
planner. Put diﬀerently: sub-prime mortgages may be socially optimal.
When all lending must be collateralized, the supply of collateral becomes
an important ﬁnancial constraint. If collateral is in short supply the necessity
of using collateral to back promises creates incentives to create collateral and
to stretch existing collateral. The state can (eﬀectively) create collateral by
issuing bonds that can be used as collateral and by promulgating law and reg-
ulation that make it easier to seize goods used as collateral.1,2 The market’s
1The home mortgage market in Israel provides a good example. Historically, govern-
ment regulation made it easy to seize owner-occupied homes on which the mortgage was in
default, but diﬃcult to seize renter-occupied homes. This asymmetry provided an incen-
tive for owners near default to rent their homes to close relatives at below-market prices.
As a consequence, down payment requirements frequently exceeded 50% of the sale price
and mortgages were diﬃcult to obtain. In the 1980’s, changes in government regulations
made it easier to seize renter-occupied homes. As a consequence, down payment require-
ments fell to levels comparable to the U.S. mortgage market and mortgages became much
easier to obtain.
2Similarly, state regulations concerning seizure can have an enormous inﬂuence on
bankruptcies; see Lin and White (2001) and Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) for instance.
2attempts to stretch collateral have driven much of the ﬁnancial engineering
that has rapidly accelerated over the last three-and-a-half decades (beginning
with the introduction of mortgage-backed securities in the early 1970’s) and
that has been designed speciﬁcally to stretch collateral by making it possible
for the same collateral to be used several times: allowing agents to collater-
alize their promises with other agents’ promises (pyramiding) and allowing
the same collateral to back many diﬀerent promises (tranching). These two
innovations are at the bottom of the securitization and derivatives boom on
Wall Street, and have greatly expanded the scope of ﬁnancial markets.
To make these points and others, we formulate an extension of intertem-
poral general equilibrium theory that incorporates durable goods, collateral
and the possibility of default. To focus the discussion, we restrict attention
to a pure exchange framework with two dates but many possible states of
nature (representing the uncertainty at time 0 about exogenous shocks at
time 1). As is usual in general equilibrium theory, we view individuals as
anonymous price-takers.3 For simplicity, we use a framework with a ﬁnite
number of agents and divisible loans.4
Central to the model is that the deﬁnition of a security must now include
not just its promised deliveries but also the collateral required to back that
promise. The same promise backed by a diﬀerent collateral constitutes a
diﬀerent security and might trade for a diﬀerent price. We assume that
collateral is held and used by the borrower and that forfeiture of collateral
is the only consequence of default; in particular, there are no penalties for
default other than forfeiture of the collateral, and there is no destruction of
property in the seizure of collateral. As a result, borrowers will always deliver
the minimum of what is promised and the value of the collateral. Lenders,
3Anonymity and price-taking might appear strange in an environment in which indi-
viduals might default. In our context, however, individuals will default when the value of
promises exceeds the value of collateral and not otherwise; thus lenders do not care about
the identity of borrowers, but only about the collateral they bring.
4The assumptions of anonymity and price-taking might be made more convincing by
building a model that incorporates a continuum of individuals, and the realism of the
model might be enhanced by allowing for indivisible loans, but doing so would complicate
the model without qualitatively changing the conclusions.
3knowing this, need not worry about the identity of the borrowers but only
about the value of the collateral. Our basic model requires that each security
be collateralized by a distinct bundle of physical goods; residential mortgages
provide the canonical example of such securities.
Although default is suggestive of disequilibrium, our model passes the ba-
sic test of consistency: under the hypotheses on agent behavior and foresight
that are standard in the general equilibrium literature, equilibrium always
exists (Theorem 1). As we show, the existence of equilibrium rests on the fact
that collateral requirements place an endogenous bound on short sales. (The
reader will recall that it is the possibility of unbounded short sales that leads
to non-existence of equilibrium in the standard model of general equilibrium
with incomplete markets.)
The familiar models of Walrasian equilibrium (WE) and of general equi-
librium with incomplete markets (GEI) tacitly assume that all agents keep
all their promises, but ignore the question of why agents should keep their
promises; implicitly the familiar models assume that there are inﬁnite penal-
ties for breaking promises – so that agents never intentionally fail to keep
their promises – and that agents never make mistakes – so that agents never
accidentally fail to keep their promises. We compare Collateral Equilibrium
(CE) to WE and GEI as a way of investigating how equilibrium changes
when we make the opposite assumption: that borrowers have no incentive
to repay and that the only recourse for the lender is to conﬁscate collateral.
As we show, modulo some technical assumptions, there are two sharp di-
chotomies. First: either CE is equivalent to GEI or there is distortion and
a non-zero liquidity wedge (Theorem 2). Second: either CE is equivalent
to WE and hence eﬃcient (Pareto optimal) or it is ineﬃcient (Theorem 3).
To illustrate these ideas, we describe a simple mortgage market (Example
1) in an environment with no uncertainty, and compute equilibrium as a
function of the wealth distribution and down payment requirements. We
identify parameter regions where CE is or is not Pareto optimal. We also
compute individual and social welfare, and show (as noted above) that the
welfare impact of collateral requirements is ambiguous: lower collateral re-
quirements make it possible for buyers to hold more houses but create more
4competition for the same houses, thereby driving up the prices. The last
point suggests an important parallel with U.S. lending institutions and hous-
ing prices over the last hundred years. Before and shortly after World War
I, mortgage down payment requirements were typically on the order of 50%.
However, the rise of Savings and Loan institutions, later the VHA and FHA,
and most recently the sub-prime mortgage market, have all made it easier
for (some) consumers to obtain mortgages with much lower down payment
requirements. Lower down payment requirements increase competition and
drive up housing prices, so some (perhaps very substantial) portion of the
boom in housing prices may have over this period should presumably be as-
cribed to these institutional changes in mortgage markets, rather than to a
change in fundamentals. (Contrast Mankiw and Weil (1989).)
An extension of our simple mortgage market to an environment with un-
certainty (Examples 2, 3) allows us to make a number of additional points.
Perhaps the most striking of these is that collateral requirements that lead
to default (with positive probability) in equilibrium may be ex ante Pareto
optimal although ex post suboptimal (with positive probability). Moreover, if
securities oﬀering the same promise but backed by diﬀerent collateral require-
ments are oﬀered, the market may choose a collateral requirement that leads
to default (with positive probability). This suggests an important implica-
tion for the subprime mortgage market which seems to have been ignored:
even if it is true that defaults on subprime mortgages led to a crash ex post,
such mortgages might well have been Pareto improving ex ante. Whether
the market always chooses eﬃcient collateral requirements or whether it can
sometimes be welfare improving for government to restrict collateral require-
ments is a question to which we do not have an answer. We do show, however,
that government action can improve social welfare only if it alters terminal
prices (Theorem 4). Hence any valid welfare-based argument for regulation
of down-payment requirements would seem to require that regulators can
correctly forecast the price changes that would accompany such regulation.
To address the way the market stretches collateral we expand our model
to include securities that are collateralized by bundles of commodities and
bundles of other securities (pooling and pyramiding) and oﬀer multiple pay-
5ment streams (tranching). As in our basic model, the requirement that bor-
rowing be collateralized implies an endogenous bound on short sales, so that
equilibrium always exists (Theorem 5). Although the existence of more com-
plicated securities expands the set of possible market outcomes, it may still
fail to yield Walrasian allocations. In particular, no collateral equilibrium
can ever achieve an allocation in which some agent’s consumption in some
terminal state has less value than his/her initial (unpledgeable) endowment
in that state (Theorem 6). As a consequence, even with pooling, pyramid-
ing and tranching, collateral equilibrium is robustly ineﬃcient: given any
array of consumer preferences and any social endowment, there is always an
open set of distributions of that endowment with the property that collateral
equilibrium from those endowments fails to be Pareto optimal (Theorem 7)
– no matter what securities are available for trade. On the other hand, any
Walrasian equilibrium in which every agent’s consumption in each terminal
state has greater value than his/her initial (unpledgeable) endowment in that
state can be obtained as a collateral equilibrium whenever a complete set of
tranched Arrow securities is available (Theorem 8). Absent tranching, this
conclusion does not hold (Example 4); thus, tranching serves an important
role in furthering social welfare. (As we will discuss, in our framework of per-
fect information, perfectly divisible goods and loans, and frictionless markets,
pooling and pyramiding serve no function when a complete set of tranched
Arrow securities is available, but will generally serve a useful function when
fewer securities are available.)
Following a brief discussion of the literature below, Section 2 presents
the basic model and Section 3 demonstrates that equilibrium exists in that
model. Section 4 describes a simple mortgage market that illustrates the
workings of the basic model and many of the points we want to make in-
cluding some of the sources of ineﬃciency. Section 5 discusses distortion,
eﬃciency and the liquidity wedge. Section 6 expands the ﬁrst example to an
uncertain environment to show that both the social planner and the market
may choose collateral requirements that lead to default and that, at least
in some circumstances, the market always chooses eﬃciently. Section 7 ex-
pands the basic model to allow for pooling, pyramiding and tranching and
demonstrates that equilibrium exists in the expanded model as well. Section
68 shows what pooling pyramiding and tranching can accomplish and what
they cannot. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
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Hellwig (1981) provides the ﬁrst theoretical treatment of collateral and de-
fault in a market setting; the focus of that work is on the extent to which
the Modigliani–Miller irrelevance theorem survives the possibility of default.
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1995) and Geanakoplos and Zame (1997,
2002), which are forerunners of the present work, provide the ﬁrst general
treatments of a market in which deliveries on ﬁnancial securities are guaran-
teed by collateral requirements. Araujo, Pascoa, and Torres-Martinez (2002)
use a version of the same basic model to show that collateral requirements
rule out the possibility of Ponzi schemes in inﬁnite-horizon models, and hence
eliminate the need for the transversality requirements that are frequently im-
posed (Magill and Quinzii, 1994; Hernandez and Santos, 1996; Levine and
Zame, 1996). Araujo, Fajardo, and Pascoa (2005) expand the model to allow
borrowers to set their own collateral levels, and Steinert and Torres-Martinez
(2007) expand the model to accommodate security pools and tranching.
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) is a seminal work in a somewhat
diﬀerent literature, which treats extra-economic penalties for default. (In
that particular paper, extra-economic penalties are modeled as direct util-
ity penalties; when penalties are suﬃciently severe, that model reduces to
the standard model in which enforcement is perfect — and costless, because
penalties are never imposed in equilibrium). One of the central points of that
paper, and of Zame (1993), which uses a very similar model, is that the pos-
sibility of default may promote eﬃciency (a point that is made here, in a dif-
ferent way, in Example 2). Kehoe and Levine (1993) builds a model in which
the consequences of default are exclusion from trade in subsequent ﬁnancial
markets, but these penalties constrain borrowing in such a way that there
is no equilibrium default. Sabarwal (2003) builds a model which combines
many of these features: securities are collateralized, but the consequences of
default may involve seizure of other goods, exclusion from subsequent ﬁnan-
7cial markets and extra-economic penalties, as well as forfeiture of collateral.
Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) provide a dynamic model of mortgages as op-
tions, but ignore the general equilibrium interrelationship between mortgages
and housing prices.
A substantial empirical literature examines the eﬀect of bankruptcy and
default rules (especially with respect to mortgage markets) on consumption
patterns and security prices. Lin and White (2001), Fay, Hurst, and White
(2002), Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2005) and Girardi, Shapiro, and Willen
(2008) are closest to the present work.
82 Basic Model
As in the canonical model of securities trading, we consider a world with two
dates; agents know the present but face an uncertain future. At date 0 (the
present) agents trade a ﬁnite set of commodities and securities. Between date
0 and date 1 (the future) the state of nature is revealed. At date 1 securities
pay oﬀ and commodities are traded again.
2.1 Time & Uncertainty
There are two dates, 0 and 1, and S possible states of nature at date 1. We
frequently refer to 0,1,...,S as spots.
2.2 Commodities, Markets & Prices
There are L ≥ 1 commodities available for consumption and trade in spot
markets at each date and state of nature; the commodity space is RL(1+S) =
RL × RLS. We interpret x ∈ RL(1+S) as a claim to consumption at each
date and state of the world. For a bundle x ∈ RL(1+S) and indices s,`,
we write xs for the vector of spot s consumption speciﬁed by x, and xs`
for the quantity of commodity ` speciﬁed in spot s. We abuse notation
and view RL as the subspace of RL(1+S) consisting of those vectors which
are 0 in the last LS coordinates; thus we identify a vector x ∈ RL with
(x,0,...,0) ∈ RL(1+S). Similarly we view RLS as the subspace of RL(1+S)
consisting of those vectors which are 0 in the ﬁrst L coordinates. We write
δs` ∈ RL(1+S) for the commodity bundle consisting of one unit of commodity
` in spot s and nothing else. We write x ≥ y to mean that xs` ≥ ys` for each
s,`; x > y to mean that x ≥ y and x 6= y; and x  y to mean that xs` > ys`
for each s,`.
We depart from the usual intertemporal models by allowing for the pos-
sibility that goods are durable. If x0 ∈ RL is consumed (used) at date 0
we write Fs(x0) for what remains in state s at date 1. We assume the map
9F : S × RL → RL is continuous and is linear and positive in consumption.
The commodity 0` is perishable if F(δ0`) ≡ 0 and durable otherwise. It may
be helpful to think of F as like a production function — except that inputs
to production can also be consumed.
For each s, there is a spot market for consumption at spot s. Prices
at each spot lie in RL
++, so R
L(1+S)
++ is the space of spot price vectors. For
p ∈ RL(1+S), ps are the prices in spot s and ps` is the price of commodity `
in spot s.
2.3 Consumers
There are I consumers (or types of consumers). Consumer i is described by
a consumption set, which we take to be R
L(1+S)
+ , an endowment ei ∈ R
L(1+S)
+ ,




A collateralized security (security for short) is a pair A = (A,c), where
A : S × RL
++ × RL
++ → R+ is the promise or face value, and c ∈ RL
+ is the
collateral requirement. We allow for the possibility that the amount promised
in each state depends on spot prices in that state and at date 0; hence A
is a function (assumed continuous) of the state and of prices at date 0 and
in that state at date 1. The collateral requirement c is a bundle of date
0 commodities; an agent wishing to sell one share of (A,c) must hold the
commodity bundle c. (Recall that selling a security is borrowing.)
In our framework, the collateral requirement is the only means of enforc-
ing promises. Hence, if agents optimize, the delivery per share of security
(A,c) in state s will not be the face value As(p0,ps) but rather the minimum
of the face value and the value of the collateral in state s:
Del((A,c),s,p) = min{As(p0,ps), ps · Fs(c)}








We take as given a ﬁnite (but perhaps very large) set of securities A =
{(A1,c1),...,(AJ,cJ)}. Because deliveries never exceed the value of col-
lateral, we assume without loss of generality that Fs(cj) 6= 0 for some s.
(Securities that fail this requirement will deliver nothing; in equilibrium such
securities will have 0 price and purchases or sales of such securities will be
irrelevant.) We ﬁnd it convenient to distinguish between security purchases
and sales; we typically write ϕ,ψ ∈ RJ
+ for portfolios of security purchases
and sales, respectively. We assume that buying and selling prices for secu-
rities are identical; we write q ∈ RJ
+ for the vector of security prices. An
agent who sells the portfolio ψ ∈ RJ
+ will have to hold (and will enjoy) the
collateral bundle Coll(ψ) =
P
ψjcj.
Our formulation allows for nominal securities, for real securities, for op-
tions and for complicated derivatives. For ease of exposition, our examples
focus on real securities.
2.5 The Economy
An economy (with collateralized securities) is a tuple E = h(ei,ui),Ai, where
(ei,ui) is a ﬁnite family of consumers and A = {(Aj,cj)} is a family of
collateralized securities. (The set of commodities and the durable goods
technology are ﬁxed, so are suppressed in the notation.) Write e =
P
ei for
the social endowment. The following assumptions are always in force:
• Assumption 1 e + F(e)  0
• Assumption 2 For each consumer i: ei > 0
• Assumption 3 For each consumer i:
(a) ui is continuous and quasi-concave
11(b) if x ≥ y ≥ 0 then ui(x) ≥ ui(y)
(c) if x ≥ y ≥ 0 and xs` > ys` for some s 6= 0 and some `, then
ui(x) > ui(y)
(d) if x ≥ y ≥ 0, x0` > y0`, and commodity 0` is perishable, then
ui(x) > ui(y)
The ﬁrst assumption says that all goods are represented in the aggregate
(keeping in mind that some date 1 goods may only come into being when
date 0 goods are used). The second assumption says that that individual
endowments are non-zero. The third assumption says that utility functions
are continuous, quasi-concave, weakly monotone, strictly monotone in date
1 consumption of all goods and in date 0 consumption of perishable goods.5
2.6 Budget Sets
Given a set of securities A, commodity prices p and security prices q, a
consumer with endowment e must make plans for consumption, for security
purchases and sales, and for deliveries against promises. In view of our
earlier comments, we assume that deliveries are precisely the minimum of
promises and the value of collateral, so we suppress the choice of deliveries.
We therefore deﬁne the budget set B(p,q,e,A) to be the set of plans (x,ϕ,ψ)
that satisfy the budget constraints at date 0 and in each state at date 1 and
the collateral constraint at date 0.
• At date 0
p0 · x0 + q · ϕ ≤ p0 · e0 + q · ψ
x0 ≥ Coll(ψ)
That is, expenditures for consumption and security purchases do not
exceed income from endowment and from security sales, and date 0
consumption includes collateral for all security sales.
5We do not require strict monotonicity in durable date 0 goods because we want to
allow for the possibility that claims to date 1 consumption are traded at date 0; of course,
such claims would typically provide no utility at date 0.
12• In state s
ps · xs + Del(ψ,s,p) ≤ ps · es + ps · Fs(x0) + Del(ϕ,s,p)
That is, expenditures for consumption and for deliveries on promises do
not exceed income from endowment, from the return on date 0 durable
goods, and from collections on others’ promises.
If these conditions are satisﬁed, we frequently say that the portfolio (ϕ,ψ)
ﬁnances x at prices p,q. Of course agents know date 0 prices but must
forecast date 1 prices. Our equilibrium notion implicitly incorporates the
requirement that forecasts be correct, so we take the familiar shortcut of
suppressing forecasts and treating all prices as known to agents at date 0.6
Note that if security promises are independent of date 0 prices and ho-
mogeneous of degree 1 in state s prices — in particular, if securities are real
(promise delivery of the value of some commodity bundle) — then budget
constraints depend only on relative prices. In general — for instance, if secu-
rity promises are nominal — budget constraints may depend on price levels
as well as on relative prices.
2.7 Collateral Equilibrium
Given an economy E = h(ei,ui),Ai, a collateral equilibrium consists of com-
modity prices p ∈ R
L(1+S)
++ , security prices q ∈ RJ
+ and consumer plans
(xi,ϕi,ψi) satisfying the usual conditions:























6Barrett (2000) oﬀers a model in which forecasts might be incorrect.












(As in a production economy, the market clearing condition for commodi-
ties incorporates the fact that some date 1 commodities come into being from
date 0 activities.)
2.8 Walrasian Equilibrium and GEI Equilibrium
We will ﬁnd it useful to compare collateral equilibrium with the benchmarks
of Walrasian equilibrium and of GEI (incomplete markets) equilibrium.
We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of Walrasian equilibrium in the present con-
text; see Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) for further details. We
maintain the same structure of commodities and preferences. In particular,
date 0 commodities are durable, and Fs(x0) is what remains in state s if the
bundle x0 is consumed at date 0. Suppressing commodities and the nature
of durability, the data of a durable goods economy is thus a set (ei,ui) of
consumers, speciﬁed by endowments and utility functions. We use notation
in which a purchase at date 0 conveys the rights to what remains at date 1;
hence if commodity prices are p ∈ R
(1+S)L
++ , the Walrasian budget set for a
consumer whose endowment is e is
B
W(e,p) = {x : p · x ≤ p · e + p · F(x0)}
A Walrasian equilibrium consists of commodity prices p and consumption
choices xi such that



























In the familiar GEI model, as in our collateral model, goods are traded
on spot markets but only securities are traded on intertemporal markets.
In the GEI context a security is a claim to income at each future state s
as a function of prices p0,ps at date 0 and in state s; that is, a function
A : S ×RL ×RL → R. The data of a GEI economy consists of I consumers,
characterized by utility functions ui and endowments ei, and J securities Aj.
To maintain the parallel with our collateral framework, it is convenient
to continue to separate security purchases and sales. Given commodity spot
prices p ∈ R
L(1+S)
++ and security prices q ∈ RJ, the budget set BGEI(p,q,e,{Aj})
for a consumer with endowment e consists of consumption plans x ∈ R
L(1+S)
+
and portfolios of security purchases and sales ϕ,ψ ∈ RJ that satisfy the
budget constraints at date 0 and in each state at date 1:
• At date 0
p0 · x0 + q · θ ≤ p0 · e0
• In state s











Note that the GEI budget set diﬀers from the collateral budget set in
two ways: there is no collateral requirement at date 0, and security deliveries
coincide with promises.
A GEI equilibrium consists of commodity spot prices p ∈ R
L(1+S)
++ , security
prices q ∈ RJ, consumption plans xi ∈ R
L(1+S)
+ and portfolio choices ϕi,ψi ∈
RJ
+ such that






































In our formulation of the Walrasian economy, the purchase of a durable good
at date 0 conveys the rights to what the durable becomes at date 1. Because
date 1 commodities are marketed at date 0, the rental of a durable – the
purchase of date 0 rights only – can be accomplished by a purchase of the
durable together with the simultaneous sale of the rights to what the durable
becomes at date 1. Thus, the rental price of x0 ∈ RL
+ is p · x0 − p · F(x0).
If the right securities are available, then rental markets can be synthesized
in our collateralized security market as well. Suppose that there is a vector
of durable goods x0 = c, and a security (A,c) that promises at least the value
of the collateral in every state in period 1, As ≥ ps · Fs(c) ∀s ≥ 1. If q is the
price of this security, then the rental price of the bundle c ∈ RL
+ is p0 · c − q.
Of course date 0 purchases of date 1 goods can be synthesized as well,
if the right securities exist, because purchasing only the date 1 rights (i.e,
F(x0)) to the durable x0 amounts to the purchasing the security (A,c) above
that promises delivery of at least the value of what the durable becomes in
16each state at date 1 (As ≥ ps · Fs(x0) ) and is collateralized by the durable
itself (c = x0). However, date 0 sales of date 1 commodities usually cannot be
synthesized through security markets, because selling only the date 1 rights
to the durable x0 amounts to selling the security (A,c) without holding the
requisite collateral.
173 Equilibrium
Under the assumptions discussed in Section 2, collateral equilibrium always
exists. We defer this and all other proofs to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 (Existence) Under the maintained assumptions, every econ-
omy admits a collateral equilibrium.
This may seem a surprising result, because we allow for real securities,
options, derivatives and even more complicated non-linear securities; in the
standard model of incomplete ﬁnancial markets, the presence of any of these
securities may be incompatible with existence of equilibrium.7 In our frame-
work, however, the requirement that security sales be collateralized places an
endogenous bound on short sales. As in Radner (1972), a bound on short sales
eliminates the discontinuity in budget sets that gives rise to non-existence
and thus restores the existence of equilibrium.8
7See Hart (1975) for the seminal example of non-existence of equilibrium with real
securities, Duﬃe and Shafer (1985) and Duﬃe and Shafer (1986) for generic existence with
real securities, and Ku and Polemarchakis (1990) for robust examples of non-existence of
equilibrium with options.
8Araujo, Pascoa, and Torres-Martinez (2002) exploit a similar idea to show that col-
lateral requirements rule out Ponzi schemes in markets with an inﬁnite horizon.
184 A Simple Mortgage Market
In this section we oﬀer a simple example that illustrates the working of our
model and some of the points described in the Introduction, and suggests
some of the general results that follow. For the sake of simplicity, the various
examples that follow are all variants of this simple example.
Example 1 [A Mortgage Market] Consider a world with no uncertainty
(S = 1). There are two goods at each date: food F which is perishable and
housing H which is perfectly durable. There are two (types of) consumers,
with endowments
e
1 = (18 − w,1;9,0)
e
2 = (w,0;9,0)
We take w ∈ (0,18) as a parameter; we will be especially interested in the
case w = 7/2. Consumer 1 ﬁnds food and housing to be perfect substitutes
and has constant marginal utility of consumption; Consumer 2 ﬁnds date 0
housing and date 1 housing to be perfect substitutes, likes housing more than
Consumer 1, but has decreasing marginal utility for date 0 food:
u
1 = x0F + x0H + x1F + x1H
u
2 = logx0F + 4x0H + x1F + 4x1H
As a benchmark, we begin by recording the unique Walrasian equilibrium
h˜ p, ˜ xi (leaving the simple calculations to the reader). If we normalize so that
˜ p0F = 1 then equilibrium prices are:
˜ p0F = 1 , ˜ p1F = 1 , ˜ p0H = 8 , ˜ p1H = 4
equilibrium consumptions are:
˜ x
1 = (17,0;18 − w,0)
˜ x
2 = (1,1;w,1)
19and equilibrium utilities are
˜ u
1 = 35 − w
˜ u
2 = 8 + w
Consumer 2 likes housing much more than Consumer 1 and is rich in date
1, so, whatever her date 0 endowment, she buys all the date 0 housing —
borrowing from her date 1 endowment if necessary, and of course repaying if
she does so. Individual equilibrium utilities depend on w, but total utility is
always 43 — which is the level it must be at any Pareto eﬃcient allocation
in which both agents consume food in date 1. (Because both agents have
constant marginal utility of 1 for date 1 food, the economy has transferable
utility in the range of allocations where both consume date 1 food.)
In the GEI world, in which securities always deliver precisely what they
promise and security sales do not need to be collateralized, the Walrasian
outcome will again obtain there are at least as many independent securities
as states of nature — in this case, at least one security whose payoﬀ is never
0. For comparison purposes, suppose exactly one security ˆ Aα is available,
delivering the value of α > 0 units of food. Commodity and asset prices are
˜ p0F = 1 , ˜ p1F = 1 , ˜ p0H = 8 , ˜ p1H = 4 , qα = α
and equilibrium consumptions and utilities are:
˜ x1 = (17,0;18 − w,0) ˜ u1 = 35 − w
˜ x2 = (1,1;w,1) ˜ u2 = 8 + w
However, in the world of collateralized securities, no agent can make
guarantees to pay without oﬀering collateral, and Walrasian outcomes need
not obtain. To the extent Consumer 2 can use housing as collateral, she will
be able to buy more housing with borrowed money. However, competition
also raises the price of housing. We can trace out the eﬀects of these opposite
forces across the range of security promises — equivalently, across the range
of collateral requirements.
We assume that only one security (Aα,c) = (αp1F,δ0H) is available for
trade; (Aα,c) promises the value of α units of food in date 1 and is collat-
eralized by 1 unit of date 0 housing. We take w ∈ (0,18) and α ∈ [0,4]
20as parameters. (As we show below, delivery will never exceed 4, no matter
what promises are, so that equilibrium when α > 4 will reduce to equilibrium
when α = 4.)
The nature of collateral equilibrium depends in a complicated way on
the parameters w,α. To begin the analysis, note ﬁrst that we are free to
normalize so that p0F = 1. Moreover, because (Aα,c) is a real security
we are also free to normalize so that p1F = 1. It is easily seen that in every
collateral equilibrium, Consumer 1 lends (buys the security) and Consumer 2
borrows (sells the security), that both consumers consume food in both dates,
and that Consumer 2 acquires all the housing at date 1. Hence many of the


















It follows from (1) that p1H = 4. Because α ∈ [0,4], the date 1 value
of collateral (weakly) exceeds the promise Aα, so Del(Aα,p) = α; hence
MU1
(Aα,c) = 4. Now (2) implies that qα = α. Summarizing: for all w ∈ (0,18),
all α ∈ [0,4], and in every equilibrium we have
p0F = 1 , p1F = 1 , p1H = 4 , qα = α , ψ
1 = 0 , ϕ
2 = 0 (3)
As we shall see, the values of the remaining equilibrium variables — in-
deed the nature of equilibrium — depend sensitively on α,w. It is convenient
to classify equilibrium according to the quantity of housing held and the frac-
tion of borrowing capacity exercised by Consumer 2; in principle this leads
to 9 possible types of equilibria, as in Table 1. Because the collateral require-
ment entails that ψ2 ≤ x2
0H, there are in fact no equilibria of type Ib or Ic;
for the present functional forms, there are no equilibria of type IIb either.
(But there would be equilibria of type IIb for some other functional forms.)
For all the other types, we solve simultaneously for the equilibrium variables
and the region in the parameter space in which an equilibrium of that type
21Table 1: Types of Equilibrium
ψ2/x2
0H = 0 ψ2/x2
0H ∈ (0,1) ψ2/x2
0H = 1
x2
0H = 0 Ia Ib Ic
x2
0H ∈ (0,1) IIa IIb IIc
x2
0H = 1 IIIa IIIb IIIc
(unique in the present setting) obtains. We give details for types IIc and
IIIc, leaving the calculations for other types to the reader.
We begin by analyzing equilibrium of type IIc. Consumer 1 holds food
and housing at date 0, so he can trade housing for food or vice versa. Thus










0H = 5: Consumer 1 enjoys 1 util from living in the house at
date 0 and 4 more utils by selling the house at date 1 to buy 4 units of date
1 food. Hence p0H = 5.
To solve for the remaining equilibrium variables we use Consumer 2’s date
0 ﬁrst order conditions — but the correct ﬁrst order conditions may not be
obvious. Because Consumer 2 holds food and housing at date 0, it might

















Consumer 2 enjoys 4 utils from living in the house at each date, so MU2
0H = 8.
In view of our earlier calculations, it follows from (5) that MU2
0F = 8/5 and
from (6) that MU2
0F = 1, which is nonsense.
The problem with the analysis above is that (5) and (6) are not the cor-
rect ﬁrst order conditions for Consumer 2. Consumer 2 can borrow against
22date 1 income by selling the security, but selling the security requires holding
collateral. By assumption, at equilibrium x2
0H = ψ2, so Consumer 2 is exer-
cising all of her borrowing power; hence she cannot hold less housing without
simultaneously divesting herself of some of the security and cannot sell more
of the security without simultaneously acquiring more housing.
The correct ﬁrst order conditions for Consumer 2 take borrowing and
collateral into account. On the one hand, buying an additional inﬁnitesimal
amount ε of housing costs p0Hε, but of this cost αε can be borrowed by selling
α units of the security, using the additional housing as collateral, so the net
payment is only (p0H − α)ε. However, doing this will require repaying the
loan in date 1, so the additional utility obtained will not be 8ε but rather
(8 − α)ε. On the other hand, selling an additional ε units of food generates
income of εp0F at a utility cost of MU2
0Fε. Hence the correct ﬁrst order








Consumer 2’s date 0 budget constraint is

































































1 = 32 − w
u






(By deﬁnition, ψ2 = x2
0H and ϕ1 = ψ2.)
Finally, the region in which equilibria are of type IIc is deﬁned by the
requirement that x2







(5 − α)(9 − α)
8 − α

In equilibria of type IIIc, x2
0H = 1 and ψ2/x2
0H = 1 so Consumer 1 no
longer holds housing in date 0, and we cannot guess in advance what the
price of housing will be in period 0, but must solve for it along with the
other variables. Reasoning as above, we see that Consumer 2’s date 0 ﬁrst-
















































+ 17 − α
Finally, the region in which equilibria are of type IIIc is determined by the
requirements that it be optimal for Consumer 2 to borrow the maximum
amount possible, whence x0F ≤ 1, and that Consumer 1 not wish to buy








(9 − α) ≤ w ≤ (9 − α)

Summarizing these ﬁndings and similar calculations for the other regions,












1 = 32 − w
u
2 = logw + 9
Region Ia =





• Type Ib none


























































































































1 = 32 − w
u



























































1 = 35 − w
u
2 = 8 + w
Region IIIb = {(w,α) : 9 − α < w < 9}
27• Type IIIc






































(9 − α) ≤ w ≤ (9 − α)

As we have already noted, whatever the parameters are, p1H = 4 in every
equilibrium. Thus, if α > 4 an agent who sells (Aα,c) will default, and
delivery will be 4 rather than α. Hence equilibrium when α > 4 will coincide
with equilibrium when α = 4. ♦
We have chosen a formulation in which the security promise is speciﬁed
exogenously and its price is determined endogenously. In the context of home
mortgages, a more familiar formulation would specify the down payment
requirement (as a fraction of the sale price) exogenously and the interest
rate would be determined endogenously. Of course, the two formulations are
equivalent: the down payment requirement d, interest rate r, house price







This example illustrates a number of important points about collateral
equilibrium.
28• Collateral equilibrium may be ineﬃcient, even though ﬁnancial markets
are “complete”. In this example, ineﬃciency is easy to identify because,
as we have already noted, at least over the set of allocations at which
both consume date 1 food, the economy displays transferable utility:
an allocation is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if the sum of individual
utilities is 43 (which is the maximum possible sum); these allocations
are precisely those for which Consumer 2 holds all the housing in both
dates and exactly one unit of date 0 food; i.e., x2
0H = x2
1H = 1 and
x2
0F = 1. Hence, collateral equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient only in the
portion of region IIIa where w = 9, in all of region IIIb, and in the
portion of region IIIc where w = 9−α, and when collateral equilibrium
is eﬃcient it coincides with Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, there
is an open set of endowment distributions from which no collateral
equilibrium is eﬃcient. We return to these points in Theorems 3 and
7 below.
• The ineﬃciency of collateral equilibrium has two sources. Most obvi-
ously, collateral requirements limits each consumer’s borrowing power.
This can be seen most extremely in the portion of region IIIa where
w > 9: Consumer 2’s equilibrium marginal utility of food is greater in
date 1 than in date 0, so she would like to save, but she can only do so
if Consumer 1 borrows — and Consumer 1 can only borrow by holding
housing, which he does not wish to do.
A little less obviously, collateral requirements distort consumption de-
cisions, forcing agents who borrow to hold more of the collateral good
than they would otherwise wish to do. For instance, ﬁx w = 7/2. For
α ∈ (0,2) parameter values are in region IIc; for α ∈ [2,4] parameter
values are in region IIIc, but in either case, the collateral requirement
leads Consumer 2 to hold excess housing. The simplest way to see this
is to compare marginal utilities per dollar for date 0 food and date 0
housing: In region IIc Consumer 2’s marginal utility per dollar for date
0 food is (8−α)/(5−α) which is everywhere greater than her marginal
utility per dollar from date 0 housing, which is 8/5. In region IIIc
Consumer 2’s marginal utility per dollar for date 0 food is (2/7)(9−α)
29which is everywhere greater than her marginal utility per dollar from
date 0 housing, which is 16/[7(α + 8−α
9−α)].
• The same kind of distortion can be seen in prices. Again ﬁx w = 7/2.
To say that Consumer 2’s marginal utility per dollar for date 0 food
exceeds her marginal utility per dollar for date 0 housing is the say
that the price of date 0 housing is too high. However, Consumer 2
is willing to pay the higher price of date 0 housing because holding
housing enables her to borrow; that is, she derives a collateral value
from housing as well as a consumption value. Consumer 2 ﬁnds the
marginal utility per dollar for date 0 food to be higher than the marginal
utility of making the payments on the security. Just as the price of the
collateral is too high, so the price of the security is too high. She
therefore sells the security, that is she borrows, up to her collateral
limit. As we shall see in Theorem 2 below, , this phenomenon always
occurs when the collateral requirement binds.
• As we have already noted, collateral requirements have welfare eﬀects,
but the directions of these eﬀects may not be obvious. To make the
point, ﬁx w = 7/2 once again. For α ∈ [0,2), increases in α (equiv-
alently, decreases in the down payment requirement) make it possible
for Consumer 2 to aﬀord more housing; the net result is Pareto im-
proving. However, for α ∈ [2,4], further increases in α (equivalently,
further decreases in the down payment requirement) make it possible
for Consumer 2 to access more of his/her date 1 income to purchase
houses at date 0; competition (of Consumer 2 with his/her self – or
of consumers of the same type with each other) drives up the price of
date 0 housing (from p0H = 5 when α = 2 to p0H = 34/5 when α = 4);
this price increase makes Consumer 1 better oﬀ but makes Consumer
2 worse oﬀ.
305 Fundamental Values & the Liquidity Wedge
The purpose of this section is to identify the distortion induced by the neces-
sity to hold collaterl: whenever the collateral constraints are binding, then
there must be an agent who pays more for some collateral good, and borrows
more by selling some security, than she thinks is merited by their respective
“fundamental values”.
To make this point, ﬁx an economy E = h(ei,ui),Ai and a collateral equi-
librium hp,q,(xi,ϕi,ψi)i for E. Assume (for the remainder of this Section)
that utility functions ui are diﬀerentiable at the equilibrium consumptions
and that each consumer’s consumption is non-zero in each spot s ≥ 0. Con-
sider consumer i. For each state s ≥ 1 and commodity k, consumer i’s






By assumption, xs 6= 0 so there is some ` for which xi
s` > 0; for any such `,









Durability means that i’s utility for 0k has two parts: utility from consuming
0k at date 0 consumption and utility from the income derived by selling what











s [ps · Fs(δ0k)]
Again, there is some ` for which xi
0` > 0; for any such `, marginal utility of









The marginal utility of any security (A,c) to consumer i is the utility gener-

























To explain the terminology, consider the incomplete markets economy ˇ E =





If hp,q,(xi,ϕi,ψi)i were a GEI equilibrium for E then the ﬁrst order condi-
tions would imply immediately that for each consumer i, commodity prices
weakly exceed fundamental values, with equality for those commodities for







Note that (9) holds with equality if i consumes commodity 0k but that (10)
holds whether or not i is buys or sells security j.
However, in a collateral equilibrium that does not reduce to GEI equilib-
rium — that is, a collateral equilibrium in which some collateral constraints
bind — some prices will strictly exceed fundamental values for some con-
sumer. Indeed, there will be at least one consumer who pays more for some
commodity than its fundamental value (because that consumer derives value
from using that commodity as collateral) and who sells some security for
more than its fundamental value (because that consumer ﬁnds money at
date 0 to be more valuable than the deliveries at date 1).
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Values) Let E = hei,ui),Ai be an economy
with collateralized securities and let hp,q,xi,ϕi,ψii be an equilibrium for E.
Assume that each consumer’s equilibrium consumption is non-zero in each
spot and that utilities are diﬀerentiable at equilibrium consumptions. Then
either
32(i) each consumer ﬁnds that all date 0 commodities he holds and all se-
curities are priced at their fundamental values and hp,q,xi,ϕi,ψii is a
GEI for the incomplete markets economy h(ei,ui, ˇ Ai
or
(ii) some consumer ﬁnds that some date 0 commodity he holds and some
security are priced above their fundamental value.
Thus, when collateral constraints are binding, there is a consumer i, a
commodity 0k and a security j for which the diﬀerences p0k − FV i
0k and
qj − FV i
ˇ Aj are strictly positive. We identify this as a liquidity wedge.
One consequence of Theorem 2 is that, when collateral constraints are
binding, arbitrage eﬃciency does not hold; that is, prices do not equate
ratios of marginal utilities across all consumers. A second consequence is
that eﬃcient collateral equilibria are Walrasian.
Theorem 3 (Eﬃcient Collateral Equilibria are Walrasian) Let E =
h(ei,ui),Ai be an economy with collateralized securities and let hp,q,xi,ϕi,ψii
be an equilibrium for E. Assume that each consumer’s equilibrium consump-
tion is non-zero in each spot, that utilities are diﬀerentiable at equilibrium
consumptions, and that at least one consumer’s consumption of every good
is strictly positive. Then either
(i) (xi) is a Pareto optimal allocation and hp,q,xii is a WE for the econ-
omy hei,uii
or
(ii) (xi) is not a Pareto optimal allocation and some consumer ﬁnds that
some date 0 commodity he holds and some security are priced above
their fundamental value to her.
336 Default, Eﬃciency and Crashes
This Section makes a number of related points. The ﬁrst point is that default
— although suggestive of ineﬃciency — may be welfare enhancing.9 More
precisely, as Example 2 shows, levels of collateral that are socially optimal
may lead to default with positive probability. The second point is that there
is a link between collateral requirements and future prices. Lower collateral
requirements lead buyers to take on more debt; the diﬃculties of servicing
this debt can lead to reduced demand and lower prices — even to crashes
— in the future. Importantly, such a crash occurs precisely because lower
collateral requirements encourage borrowers to take on more debt than they
can service. As Example 2 also shows, despite such crashes, lower collateral
requirements may be welfare enhancing. The third point is that although
the set of securities available for trade is given exogenously as part of the
data of the model, the set of securities that are actually traded is determined
endogenously at equilibrium. Thus, we may view the ﬁnancial structure of
the economy as chosen by the competitive market. As Example 3 shows,
the market may choose levels of collateral that lead to default with positive
probability, and this choice may be eﬃcient. Theorem 4 indentiﬁes a context
in which the market choice of securities (in particular collateral levels) is
necessarily eﬃcient.
Example 2 (A Mortgage Market with Uncertainty) We construct a
variant on Example 1. Rather than present a full-blown analysis in the style
of Example 1, we ﬁx endowments and take only the security promise as a
parameter, which makes it easier to focus on the points of interest.
There are two states of nature and two goods: Food, which is perishable,






9A similar point has been made, in diﬀerent contexts, by Zame (1993), Sabarwal (2003)
and Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005).
34Consumer 1 has constant marginal utility of consumption for food and hous-
ing at each date/state; Consumer 2 has constant marginal utility for housing
at each date/state but decreasing marginal utility for date 0 food; both con-
sumers view the states as equally likely:
u
1 = x0F + x0H +
1
2





2 = logx0F + 4x0H +
1
2




(Note that endowments and preferences are similar to those in Example 1,
except that Consumer 1’s marginal utility for housing in state 2 is greater
than in state 1 and that Consumer 2 is poor in state 2.)
Suppose that a single security Aα = (αp1F,αp2F;δ0H), promising the
value of α units of food and collateralized by 1 unit of housing, is available
for trade; we take α ∈ [0,4] as a parameter.10 (Equivalently, we could con-
sider securities that promise to deliver the value of one unit of food and are
collateralized by 1/α units of housing.) We distinguish four regions; in each
there is a unique equilibium. In Region I, α is suﬃciently small that Con-
sumer 2 cannot borrow enough to buy all the housing at date 0, but buys the
remaining housing in date 1. In Region II, α is large enough that Consumer
2 can buy all the housing at date 0 but small enough that she will be able to
honor her promises in both states at date 1 and retain all the housing at date
1. In Region III, Consumer 2 will honor her promises but will not be able to
retain all the housing. In Region IV, Consumer 2 will default. Finally, at the
boundary of Regions II and III, equilibrium consumptions are determinate
but prices are indeterminate. The calculations in Regions I, II are almost
identical to those in Example 1 and are omitted; the calculations for Regions
III, IV follow the same method with the appropriate changes to incorporate
default, and are sketched.
• Region I: α ∈ [0,2)
Consumers 1 and 2 both hold date 0 housing; Consumer 2 honors her
10As before, the case α > 4 reduces to the case α = 4.










































• Region II: α ∈ [2, 5
2)
Consumer 2 holds all the housing at both dates and honors her promises

















































• Boundary between Regions II, III: α = 5
2
Consumer 2 holds all the date 0 housing and honors her promise in
date 1; in state 2 this leaves consumer 2 with all the housing and no























































• Region III: α ∈ (5
2,3]
Consumer 2 holds all the date 0 housing and honors her promise in
the good state. In the bad state, the price of housing falls to p2H = 3;
Consumer 2 has assets of 5
2+3 (endowment plus housing) and liabilities
of α (the security promise), so sells the house, repays her debt, and then
buys all the housing she can aﬀord at the price p2H = 3; Consumer 1





















































• Region IV α ∈ [3,4]
Consumer 2 holds all the date 0 housing and honors her promise in the
good state, but defaults in the bad state (delivering the house instead
of the promise α). After the default, Consumer 2 buys back all the
housing she can aﬀord (less than the available quantity of housing) at
























































Consumers 1 and 2 have constant and equal marginal utilities for food in
state 1, so this is a transferable utility economy and we may identify social
welfare with the sum of individual utilities. Direct computation shows that
• 0 ≤ α < 2: welfare of both Consumer 1 and Consumer 2 is increasing,
and social welfare is increasing
• for 2 < α ≤ 4: welfare of Consumer 1 is increasing and welfare of
Consumer 2 is decreasing, and social welfare is increasing
In particular, social welfare attains its maximum when α = 4, so collateral
levels that lead to default with positive probability are socially eﬃcient. ♦
In our framework, the set of securities available for trade is given exoge-
nously, but the set of securities actually traded is determined endogenously at
equilibrium. Because the former set might be very large — conceptually, all
conceivable securities — we can view the action of the market as determining
the observed security structure. In the present context, the market chooses
the most eﬃcient collateral requirements even though those requirements
lead to default in the bad state.
Example 3 (Which Securities are Traded?) We maintain the entire
structure of Example 2, except that some set {Aα} of securities is available
for trade where as above Aα = (αp1F,αp2F;δ0H) promises the value of α units
of food and is collateralized by one unit of housing (Equivalently: a ﬁnite
38number of collateral requirements are possible.) To be consistent with our
framework, we assume the set of available securities (the range of collateral
requirements oﬀered) is ﬁnite, but, at least conceptually, we might imagine
that all possible collateral requirements are oﬀered. We assert that at any
equilibrium, only the security whose promise is greatest — equivalently, the
security with the lowest collateral requirement — is traded.
To see this, consider an environment in which Aβ,Aγ are available, where
β < γ, and suppose Aβ is traded. Only Consumer 2 sells securities (borrows),
so Consumer 2’s equilibrium plan involves selling some positive amount of
Aβ. Consider the alternative plan for Consumer 2 which involves selling ε
fewer shares of Aβ and ε more shares of Aγ. Given the speciﬁed endowments,
Consumer 2’s equilibrium consumption must be non-zero in date 0 and in
both states at date 1, so if ε is small enough, this alternative plan is feasible.
Moreover, because securities are priced at their expected payoﬀs, this alter-
native plan is preferred if Consumer 2’s marginal utility for income in date
0 exceeds his expected marginal utility for income in date 1.
To see that this is indeed the case, ﬁrst estimate marginal utility of income
in each state. In state 1, prices are p1F = 1,p1H = 4 so Consumer 2’s marginal
utility of income is 1. In state 2, prices are p2F = 1,p2H ≥ 3 so Consumer 2’s
marginal utility of income is at most 4/3. Hence expected marginal utility
of income in date 1 is at most 7/6. Marginal utility of income in date 0 is
the maximum of marginal utility per dollar for food and marginal utility per
dollar for housing. The former exceeds 7/6 unless x2
0F ≥ 6/7. If Consumer
1 holds any housing at all, then p0H = 5, so if x2
0F ≥ 6/7 then the marginal
utility of a dollar of housing to Consumer 2 is greater than the marginal
utility of a dollar of food, which is a contradiction. Hence Consumer 1 holds
no housing, so that x2

















Hence marginal utility of housing per dollar is at least 8/(93/14) = 112/93 >
7/6. Hence marginal utility of income at date 0 is greater than expected
marginal utility of income at date 1. Thus, the alternative plan is preferred,
which contradicts optimality of equilibrium plans. We conclude that Aβ is
39not traded, as asserted. ♦
In this environment at least, the market chooses eﬃcient collateral levels
— even though those collateral levels may lead to default. Characterizing
economies when the market does or does not choose eﬃcient collateral levels
seems an important and diﬃcult question, to which we do not know the an-
swer. (Indeed, because multiple equilibria are possible, it is not entirely clear
precisely how to formulate the question.) However, the answer is aﬃrmative
in at least one important case: if date 1 prices do not depend on collateral
levels.
Theorem 4 (Constrained Optimality) Every set of collateral equilibrium
plans is Pareto optimal among all sets of plans that:
(a) are socially feasible;
(b) given whatever date 0 decisions are assigned, respect each consumer’s
budget set at every state s at date 1 at the given equilibrium prices;
(c) call for deliveries on securities that are the minimum of the promise
and the value of collateral.
In particular, sequestering securities cannot lead to a Pareto improvement
unless date 1 prices change; if date 1 prices do not change, the market chooses
the security structure eﬃciently. In particular, if only one good is available
for consumption at date 1, then collateral equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient
and the market chooses the security structure eﬃciently; compare Kilenthong
(2006).
407 Securitization
Securitization usually refers to the process of converting non-tradable assets
into tradable securities through the repacking of their cash ﬂows (Elul, 2005).
More generally, we may think of securitization as the process of creating
securities – we shall refer to them as security pools – that are collateralized
by other securities. In general, the securities used as collateral might in turn
be collateralized by other securites, and so forth through many layers, but for
our purposes it shall be enough to allow for only a single layer; we leave the
straightforward generalization to the interested reader. This section presents
the formal model; discussion and applications to welfare are discussed in
Section 8
Fix commodities and a family A = {(A1,c1),...,(AJ,cJ)} of collateral-
ized securities. A security pool is a tuple B = (B1,...,BT;χ) where each
tranche Bt is a promise of delivery as a function of prices, and χ = (χ),χ1) ∈
RL
+ × RJ
+ (a bundle of commodities and a portfolio of securities) is the col-
lateral requirement. It is convenient to write:
Del(χ;s,p) = p · χ0 + Del(χ1;s,p)
for the delivery of the collateral requirement χ = (χ0,χ1). We interpret



















Note that the delivery on each of the promises lies (weakly) between 0 and
the delivery on the collateral. There is no loss in assuming that all pools
have the same number of tranches (because we can always add tranches that
promise 0 delivery).
If B = {B1,...,BK} is the set of available security pools, a portfolio of
41security tranches is a vector Θ ∈ RKT









An economy with collateralized securities and security pools is a tuple
E = h(ei,ui),A,Bi.
For each k,t, we write Qkt for the price of tranche Bkt of pool Bk, and
Φkti,Ψkti for consumer i’s purchases and sales of this tranche. Given spot
prices p, security prices q and tranche prices Q = (Qkt), the budget set of a
consumer whose endowment is e is the set of plans (x,ϕ,ψ,Φ,Ψ) (for con-
sumption, security purchases, security sales, tranche purchases and tranche
sales) that satisfy the budget constraints at date 0 and in each state at date
1 and the collateral constraints at date 0:
• At date 0













That is, expenditures for consumption, security purchases and pool
purchases do not exceed income from endowment, security sales and
pool sales, date 0 consumption includes collateral for all security sales
and date 0 security purchases include collateral for all pool sales. Note
that, as intended, holding the collateral χk is suﬃcient to collateralize
sales of one unit of each tranche of pool Bk.
• In state s
ps · xs + Del(ϕ;s,p) + Del(Φ;s,p) ≤ ps · es + ps · Fs(x0)
+ Del(ψ,s,p) + Del(Ψ;s,p)
42That is, expenditures for consumption and deliveries on securities and
pools do not exceed income from endowment, from the return on durable
goods, and from deliveries on security promises and pool promises.
A pool equilibrium for such an economy consists of spot prices p ∈ R
L(1+S)
+ ,
security prices q ∈ RJ
+, pool prices Q ∈ RKT
+ and consumer plans (xi,ϕi,ψi,Φi,Ψi)
satisfying the conditions:













































It is natural to think of security pools as assembled by intermediaries who
purchase all the collateral and then sells some of the tranches, holding the
rest themselves.
Our model of security pools satisﬁes the basic consistency requirement
that equilibrium exists.
43Theorem 5 (Existence of Pool Equilibrium) Every economy with col-
lateralized securities and security pools, satisfying Assumptions 1-3 (in Sec-
tion 2) admits an equilibrium.
Our model incorporates three distinct processes: pyramiding (the use
collateralized securities to collateralize further securities), pooling (the com-
bining of bundling of collateral goods and securities to collateralize diﬀerent
loans) and tranching (the using collateral goods and securities to collateralize
several securities). Section 8 shows how these processes operate when used
together (in our environment) but a brief informal discussion may guide the
reader.
• To see how pyramiding could be useful, imagine an economy with one
consumption good and three states at date 1. Suppose there is a durable
good (houses today) yields consumption in quantities (2,1,1) in the
three states. Agent 0 has utility for date 0 housing, agent 1 only wants
to consume in state 1, and agent 2 (who is very risk averse) wants to
smooth consumption perfectly in date 1. Suppose further that in the
initial condition of society, only riskless promises (i.e., promises of the
form (a,a,a) can be written. If agent 0 owns the house and sells oﬀ
a promise of (1,1,1) to agent 2, then agent 0 gets stuck consuming 1
in state 1 tomorrow. On the other hand, if agent 1 owns the house
and sells of the promise (1,1,1) to agent 2, then the right agent gets
consumption of 1 in state 1 tomorrow, but the house is in the wrong
hands. With pyramiding, agent 0 could own the house and sell oﬀ
promise (2,2,2) to agent 1. Agent 1 could use that promise – which
delivers (2,1,1) – as collateral for a futher promise of (1,1,1) to agent 2.
This achieves the eﬃcient allocation of getting 0 to live in the house,
agent 1 to consume 1 in state 1, and agent 2 to consume (1,1,1) in the
three states tomorrow. (We might think of agent h=0 as a homeowner,
agent 1 as a speculator, and agent 2 as the risk averse lender.) We see
that pyramiding, combined with default, allows for a socially superior
allocation.
• To see how pooling is useful, imagine a variant of the previous example
44in which there are two houses and two potential homeowners 0 and
0’. Suppose the ﬁrst house pays (1,1,0) and the second house pays
(1,0,1) in the three states. The optimal allocation is achieved when 0
buys the ﬁrst house and using it as collateral sells the promise (1,1,1),
thereby delivering (1,1,0). Agent 0’ buys the second house and using it
as collateral sells the promise (1,1,1), delivering (1,0,1). Agent 1 buys
both promises, pooling them together as collateral to back the promise
(1,1,1), which delivers fully and is sold to agent 2, leaving agent 1 with
the residual payoﬀ of (1,0,0). Pooling the promises allowed for the di-
versiﬁcation that made the pool able to fully cover the (1,1,1) promise.
Note that the houses could not directly be pooled together, because
they need to be owned by separate homeowners. This example illus-
trates the power of say subprime mortgage pools to enable homeowners
to borrow the money to buy houses to live in, while dividing the mort-
gage cash ﬂows between speculators and risk averse agents. In states
2 and 3 one homeowner defaults, but at the pool level the promise is
kept.11
• Tranching allows the same collateral is used to back more than one loan
or tranche. With more than one loan depending on the same collateral,
a seniority is required to deﬁne the payoﬀs. Consider the ﬁrst example
in which the homeowner buys the house and using it as collateral issues
a senior promise (ﬁrst mortgage) promising (1,1,1) and a junior tranche
(second mortgage) also promising (1,1,1). The senior tranche will fully
deliver (1,1,1) and be bought by agent 2, and the junior tranche will
deliver (1,0,0) and be bought by agent 1.
11An example in keeping with how events unfolded over the past two years, as opposed
to how they were meant to unfold in theory, would involve a fourth state in which many
both house payoﬀs are 0, forcing two defaults at the homeowner level as well as default at
the pool level.
458 Securitization and Eﬃciency
We argue here that, in a world in which all securities must be collateral-
ized, securitization promotes eﬃciency but that there are robust situations
in which eﬃciency cannot be obtained. To make these points we begin with
a simple observation.
Theorem 6 (Net Savers) If hp,q,Q,(xi,ϕi,ψi,Φi,Ψii is an equilibrium for
the economy h(ei,ui),A,Bi then each consumer’s future expenditures must






for each consumer i and state s.
This simple theorem has a striking negative consequence for eﬃciency:
provided we rule out avoid corner solutions, ineﬃciency is a robust phe-
nomenon – independently of consumer preferences and the availability of
securities and security pools.
Theorem 7 (Robust Ineﬃciency) Fix a positive social endowment e ≥ 0
and smooth utility functions (ui) that are strictly monotone and satisfy the
boundary condition.12 There is an non-empty open subset Ω of the set of
endowment proﬁles {(ei) :
P
ei = e} with the property that no collateral
equilibrium from any endowment proﬁle in Ω can be Pareto optimal, no mat-
ter what securities and security pools are available for trade.
On the other hand, any allocation that can be supported as a Walrasian
equilibrium and that Theorem 6 does not rule out as occurring in a collateral
equilibrium can in fact be obtained whenever “enough’ securities and security
pools are available.13
12That is, indiﬀerence curves through any point in the strictly positive orthant lie en-
tirely in the strictly positive orthant; Debreu (1972).
13As the proof shows, we need only a very simple set of security pools whose tranches
are Arrow securities.
46Theorem 8 (Supporting Walrasian Equilibrium) If h˜ p,(xi)i is a Wal-
rasian equilibrium for the economy h(ei,ui)i, and each consumer is a net
saver in the sense that





for each consumer i and state s, then there is a family A∗ of collateralized
securities and a family B∗ of security pools such that if A is any family
of collateralized securities and B is any family of security pools for which
A ⊃ A∗ and B ⊃ B∗ then there is an equilibrium hp,q,Q,(xi,ϕi,ψi,Φi,Ψi)i
for the economy h(ei,ui),A,,Bi with the same consumptions (and the same
commodity prices) as the given Walrasian equilibrium.
A simple example illustrates Theorem 8 and the reason why tranching is
required for eﬃcency.
Example 4 (Security Pools and Walrasian Equilibrium) We consider
another variant of Example 1. There are two states of nature, two goods
(Food and Housing), and four consumers. Each consumer assigns equal prob-
ability to the two states in date 1. Consumer 1 owns the housing and is risk
neutral; Consumer 2 likes housing much more than other consumers; Con-
sumers 3, 4 care only about food and have an insurance motive. We take the
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2 = log(x0F) + 4x0H +
1
2
























47Walrasian prices and utilities are unique but equilibrium allocations are
indeterminate:








1 = (28,0;8h + ζ,0;8h − ζ,0)
x





for ζ ∈ [0,min(8h,40 − 8h)].
For which values of h,ζ can this equilibrium be supported as a collateral
equilibrium for an appropriate choice of securities and security pools? In view
of Theorems 6 and 8, it is necessary and suﬃcient that each consumer be a
net saver. This requirement is automatically satisﬁed for Consumers 3 and
4; for Consumers 1, 2 the requirement imposes inequalities. In particular, we
conclude that
• for h ∈ [0,2) and for h ∈ (2,5] there is no Walrasian equilibrium that
can be supported as a pool equilibrium
• for h = 2 there is at least one Walrasian equilibrium that can be sup-
ported as a pool equilibrium (namely the one with ζ = 0)
• for h = 2 there are also Walrasian equilibria that cannot be supported
as a pool equilibrium (those with ζ 6= 0)
(For h ∈ (2,5], Consumer 2 is too poor at date 0, and cannot borrow
enough to buy all the housing. For h ∈ [0,2), Consumer 2 is too rich at date 0,
and cannot save because saving requires that some other consumer borrow —
but borrowing would require some other consumer to hold housing.) The pool
equilibria that support Walrasian equilibria are easy to describe: Consumer
2 buys all the housing, using it to collateralize the loan; Consumer 1 uses the
housing loans (i.e., the mortgages) to collateralize a security pool with two
48tranches, each promising to deliver the value of 8 units of food in each state;
Consumers 3 and 4 each buy one of these tranches.
It is instructive to see why collateralized securities alone are not suﬃcient
to support any of the Walrasian equilibria, including the symmetric equilib-
rium when h = 2. To support a Walrasian equilibrium, Consumers 3 and 4
must each buy insurance that pays 8 units of account in a diﬀferent state in
date 1. Buying insurance amounts to lending, and loans must be collateral-
ized; if the loans must be collateralized by durable goods then each of these
loans must be collateralized by at least two houses — so three houses cannot
collateralize both loans. Security pools “solve” this problem by making it
possible for the same houses to collateralize both loans. ♦
499 Conclusion
Collateral requirements are almost omnipresent in modern economies, but
the eﬀects of these collateral requirements have received little attention ex-
cept in circumstances where there is actual default. This paper has argued
that collateral requirements ahve important eﬀects on every aspect of the
economy — even when there is no default. Collateral requirements inhibit
lending, limit borrowing, and distort consumption decisions. The shortage of
collateral leads to ﬁnancial innovations that stretch the available collateral.
But even after all possible ﬁnancial innovations, in the presence of collateral
requirements, robust ineﬃciency is an inescapable possibility.
The model oﬀered here abstracts away from many transaction costs, in-
formational asymmetries, and many other frictions that play an important
role in real markets. It also restricts attention to a two-date world, and so
does not address issues such as default at intermediate dates. All these are
important questions for later work.
50Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 In constructing an equilibrium for E = ((ei,ui),A),
we must confront the possibility that security promises, and hence deliveries,
may be 0 at some commodity spot prices.14 (An option to buy gold at
$400/ounce will yield 0 in every state if the the spot price of gold never
exceeds $400/ounce.) Because of this, the argument is a bit delicate. We
construct, for each ρ > 0, an auxiliary economy Eρ in which security promises
are bounded below by ρ; in these auxiliary economies, equilibrium security
prices will be diﬀerent from 0. We then construct an equilibrium for E by
taking limits as ρ → 0.
For each s = 0,1,...,S, choose and ﬁx an arbitary price level βs > 0.
(Because promises are functions of prices, choosing price levels is not the same
thing as choosing price normalizations, and we do not assert that equilibrium
is independent of the price levels — only that for every set of price levels there
exists an equilibrium.) Write






∆ = ∆0 × ... × ∆S
Write 10 = (1,...,1) ∈ RL
+ and deﬁne
Q = {q ∈ R
J
+ : 0 ≤ q
j ≤ 2β010 · c
j}
We construct equilibria (for the auxiliary economies and then for our original
economy) with commodity prices in ∆ and security prices in Q.




Let Aρ = {(Aρ1,c1)...,(AρJ,cJ)}. Deﬁne the auxiliary economy Eρ =
h(ei,ui),Aρi, so Cρ diﬀers from E only in that security promises have been
increased by ρ in every state and for all spot prices.
14Non-trivial collateral requirements imply that if promises are not 0 then deliveries
cannot be 0 either.
51We ﬁrst construct truncated budget sets and demand and excess demand
correspondences in this auxiliary economy. By assumption, collateral re-
quirements for each security are non-zero. Choose a constant µ so large that,
for each j,
µc
j 6≤ ¯ e0
(Thus, to sell µ units of the security Aρj would require more collateral than
is actually available to the entire economy.) For each (p,q) ∈ ∆ × Q and
each consumer i, deﬁne the truncated budget set
B
i
0(p,q) = {π ∈ B
i(p,q,e
i ˜ A
ρ) : 0 ≤ ϕ
ij ≤ µI , 0 ≤ ψ
ij ≤ µI for each j}
and the individual truncated demand correspondence
d
i(p,q) = {π = (x,ϕ,ψ) ∈ B
i
0(p,q) : π is utility optimal in B
i
0(p,q)}
(Note that truncated demand exists at every price (p,q), because we bound
security purchases and sales. Absent such a bound, demands would certainly
be undeﬁned at some prices. For instance, if qj = 2β010 · cj, agents could
sell Aρj for enough to ﬁnance the purchase of its collateral requirement cj, so







for the aggregate demand correspondence.
For each plan π, we deﬁne security excess demand and commodity excess
demands zs(π) in each spot :
za(π) = ϕ − ψ
zs(π) = xs − ¯ es
Write
z(π) = (z0(π),...,zS(π);za(π)) ∈ R
L(1+S) × R
J
and deﬁne the aggregate excess demand correspondence




52It is easily checked that Z(p,q) is non-empty, compact, and convex for
each p,q and that the correspondence Z is upper hemi-continuous. Because
consumptions security sales are bounded, Z is also bounded below. Because
utility functions are monotone, a familiar argument (Debreu (1959)) shows
that Z satisﬁes the usual boundary condition:
||Z(p,q)|| → ∞ as (p,q) → bdy∆ × Q
(It doesn’t matter which norm we use.)
Now ﬁx ε > 0, and set
∆
ε = {p ∈ ∆ : ps` ≥ ε for each s,`}
Because Z is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence, it is bounded on
∆ε × Q; set
Z
ε = {z ∈ R
L(1+S) × R






ε × Q × Z
ε → ∆





∗) · z : (p
∗,q
∗) ∈ ∆
ε × Q} × Z(p,q)
For prices (p,q) ∈ ∆ × Q and a vector of excess demands z ∈ RL(1+S) × RJ,
(p,q) · z is the value of excess demands. We caution the reader that, in
this setting, Walras’ law need not hold for arbitrary prices: the value of
excess demand need not be 0. We shall see, however, that the value of excess
demand is 0 at the prices we identify as candidate equilibrium prices
Our construction guarantees that F ε is an upper-hemicontinuous corre-
spondence, with non-empty, compact convex values. Kakutani’s theorem
guarantees that F ε has a ﬁxed point. We assert that for some ε0 > 0 suﬃ-
ciently small, the correspondences F ε,0 < ε < ε0 have a common ﬁxed point.
To see this, write Gε ⊂ ∆ε × Q × Zε for the set of all ﬁxed points of F ε;
Gε is a non-empty compact set. We show that for some ε0 > 0 suﬃciently
small, the sets Gε are nested and decrease as ε decreases; that is, Gε1 ⊂ Gε2
whenever 0 < ε1 < ε2 < ε0.
53To see this, note ﬁrst that security deliveries are bounded, because de-
liveries never exceed the value of collateral. Hence individual expenditures
at budget feasible plans (and in particular at plans in the truncated demand
set) are bounded, independent of prices (because income from endowments
is bounded, security prices and sales are bounded, and security purchases
and deliveries are bounded). Choose an upper bound M > 0 on individ-
ual expenditures at budget feasible plans. Because commodity demands are
non-negative, individual excess demands are bounded below; choose a lower
bound −R < 0 on individual exess demands.
Because excess demand is the sum of individual demands less the sum of
endowments, it follows that if z ∈ Z(p,q) then
(p,q) · z ≤ MI
zs` ≥ −RI for each commodity s`
A familiar argument (based on strict monotonicity or preferences) shows
that if commodity prices tend to the boundary of ∆ then aggregate com-
modity excess demand blows up. If the price of some security tends to 0 but
the value of its collateral does not, then deliveries on that security do not
tend to 0, whence demand for that security and consequent aggregate com-
modity excess demand again blow up. Hence we can ﬁnd ε0 > 0 such that if
(p,q) ∈ ∆ × Q, z ∈ Z(p,q), and ps0`0 < ε0 for some spot s0 and commodity
`0 then there is some spot s1 and commodity `1 such that
zs1`1 >
1
βs1 − (L − 1)ε
h




We assert that if 0 < ε < ε0 then Gε ⊂ ∆ε0 × Q × Zε0. To see this,





ε if s = s0,` 6= `0
βs − (L − 1)ε if s = s0,` = `0
βs/L otherwise
Direct calculation using equation (11) shows that (˜ p,0) · z > MI, which is
a contradiction. We conclude that p ∈ ∆ε0 and hence that (p,q,z) ∈ Gε
0 as
desired.
54The deﬁnition of F ε implies that if 0 < ε1 < ε2 and Gε1 ⊂ ∆ε2 × Q × Zε2
then Gε1 ⊂ Gε2. Hence, for 0 < ε < ε0 the sets Gε are nested and decrease
as ε decreases. A nested family of non-empty compact sets has a non-empty






Let (p,q,z) ∈ G; we assert that z = 0 and that p,q constitute equilibrium
prices for the economy Eρ.
We ﬁrst show that excess security demand za = 0. If the excess demand
for security j were strictly positive, the requirement that (p,q) maximize
the value of excess demand would imply that qj is as big as possible: qj =
2β010 ·cj. But then agents could sell Aρj for enough to ﬁnance the purchase
of the collateral requirement, whence the excess demand for Aρj would be
negative, a contradiction. We conclude that security excess demand must
be non-positive. If the excess demand for security j were strictly negative,
the requirement that (p,q) maximize the value of excess demand would imply
that qj is as small as possible: qj = 0. But if the price of Aρj were 0 then every
agent would wish to buy it because its delivery would be min{ρ,ps·Fs(cj)} >
0. Hence the excess demand for A
ρ
j must be positive, a contradiction.15 We
conclude that za = 0.
We show next that Walras’ law holds for the prices p,q and the excess
demand z: (p,q)·z = 0. To see this, choose individual demands πi ∈ di(p,q)






For each agent i, the plan πi lies in the budget set at prices (p,q), so the date
0 expenditure required to carry out the plan πi is no greater than the value of
date 0 endowment. Because utility is strictly monotone in date 0 perishable
commodities and in all commodities in state s, optimization implies that all
15Note that we could not obtain this conclusion in the original economy, because, at the
prices (p,q) the security Aj might promise 0 in every state.
55individuals spend all their income at date 0, so we conclude that the date 0
expenditure required to carry out the plan πi is precisely equal to the value
of date 0 endowment. Put diﬀerently, the value of date 0 excess demand is
0 for each individual. Summing over all individuals, we conclude that the
value of date 0 aggregate excess demand is 0: p0·z0+q·za = 0. Now consider
any state s ≥ 1 at date 1. For individual i, we can argue exactly as above
to conclude that the value of individual excess demand is equal to the net of
deliveries on purchases and sales of securities. Thus, the value of aggregate
excess demand in state s is the net of deliveries on aggregate purchases and
sales of securities. However, za = 0 so aggregate purchases and sales of
securities are equal. We conclude that the value of aggregate excess demand
in state s is 0. Summing over all spots we conclude that (p,q) · z = 0, as
asserted.
We show next that z = 0. If not, Walras’ law entails that excess demand





ps` if s 6= s0
ε if s = s0,` 6= `0
1 − (L − 1)ε if s = s0,` = `0
Because (p,q)·z = 0 and zs0`0 > 0, (˜ p,q)·z will be strictly positive if ε is small
enough. However, this would contradict our assumption that (p,q,z) ∈ G
and hence is a ﬁxed point of F ε for every suﬃciently small ε. We conclude
that z = 0. It is clear that the prices p,q and plans (πi) identiﬁed above
constitute an equilibrium for the economy Eρ.
It remains to construct an equilibrium for the original economy E. To
this end, let p(ρ),q(ρ),(πi(ρ)) be equilibrium prices and plans for Eρ and
let ρ → 0. By construction, prices and plans lie in bounded sets, so we
may choose a sequence (ρn) → 0 for which the corresponding prices and
plans converge; let the limits be p,q,(πi). Commodity prices p do not lie on
the boundary of ∆ (for otherwise the excess demands at prices p(ρn),q(ρn)
would be unbounded, rather than 0). It follows that πi(ρ) is utility optimal
in consumer i’s budget set at prices (p,q). Because the collection of plans
(πi) is the limit of collections of socially feasible plans, it follows that they are
socially feasible and hence that the artiﬁcial bounds on security purchases and
56sales do not bind at the prices p,q. Hence p,q,(πi) constitute an equilibrium
for E.
Proof of Theorem 2 Fix a CE. As we have already observed, if this CE
reduces to GEI then the fundamental asset pricing equations must all hold.
Conversely, if the fundamental asset pricing equations hold then the ﬁrst-
order conditions for GEI hold. Because utility functions are quasi-concave
and the budget and market-clearing conditions for GEI imply the budget
and market-clearing conditions for CE, it follows that we are at a GEI. Put
diﬀerently: if the CE does not reduce to GEI then at least one of the funda-
mental pricing equations must fail; we must show that the failure(s) are of
the type(s) speciﬁed.
Not ﬁrst that, because any agent can always buy more of any good or of
any security, both commodity prices and security prices must weakly exceed
fundamental value for every agent. Thus if CE does not reduce to GEI, there
must be some agent i and some durable good he holds or some promise he is
selling for which price strictly exceeds fundamental value.
This proof seems incomplete, or at least mysterious. What if
there are NO perishable goods? What if ALL goods held by i are
used as collateral?
On the other hand, any agent can always reduce or increase all his hold-
ings of durable goods and all the promises sold by a common ε% without
violating a collateral constraint, moving the resulting revenue into or out
of perishable consumption. This marginal move must yield zero marginal
utility if the agent was optimizing. Since every exchange of durable con-
sumption for perishable consumption either yields zero marginal utility or
positive marginal utility, and every reduction of promises sold either yields
zero marginal utility or negative marginal utility, the across the board re-
duction must involve at least one durable good for which price was above
fundamental value and at least one sold promise for which price was also
above fundamental value, or agent i.
Proof of Theorem 3 If the allocation (xi) is Pareto optimal, then ratios of
57marginal utilities are equal so prices must coincide with fundamental values,
whence CE coincides with GEI. It follows exactly as in Elul (1999) that an
eﬃcient GEI in which some agent consumes a strictly positive amount of
each good is Walrasian.16
Proof of Theorem 4 Let hp,q,(xi,ϕi,ψi)i be an equilibrium, and suppose
that (ˆ xi, ˆ ϕi, ˆ ψi) is a family of plans meeting the given conditions that Pareto
dominates the equilibrium set of plans. By assumption, all the alternative
plans are feasible, meet the budget constraints at each state at date 1, and call
for deliveries that are the minumum of promises and the value of collateral,
Optimality of the equilibrium plans at prices p,q means, therefore, that all
the alternative plans (ˆ xi, ˆ ϕi, ˆ ψi) fail the budget constraints at date 0. Because
the alternative set of plans is socially feasible, summing over consumers yields
a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5 The proof follows exactly as the proof of Theorem
1 with the obvious addition of pools, pool prices, and pool purchases and
sales. We leave the details to the reader.
Proof of Theorem 6 If ps·xi
s < ps·ei
s for some consumer i and state s, then
in state s, consumer i could default on all the promises of the securities s/he
sold at date 0, surrender the collateral backing these promises, and still aﬀord
more than xi
s. This would contradict the requirement that i’s equilibrium
plan be optimal in i’s budget set. Hence ps · xi
s ≥ ps · ei
s, as asserted.
Proof of of Theorem 7 Write E = {(e1,...,eN) :
P
ei = e} for the
set of endowment proﬁles that sum to the given social endowment e. Let
Π ⊂ R
(1+S)L
++ be the set of Walrasian prices from some endowment proﬁle in
E, normalized so that p · e = 1, and let Π be its closure. A straightforward
argument shows that Π is compact.
Fix a consumer, say consumer 1, a state, say state 1, and real numbers
α,α0 with 0 < α < α0 < 1. For each w ∈ [α,α0], write X(w,p) ⊂ R
(1+S)L
+
16Elul (1999) treats the the standard model with no durable goods; the adaptation to
the present context is entirely straightforward.
58for consumer 1’s demand at wealth w and prices p and let X1(w,p) be the
component of X(w,p) in state 1. The boundary condition implies that p1 ·
X1(w,p) < w. A straightforward compactness argument implies there exists
some β < 1 such that









1 > βp · e
1 for all p ∈ Π}
Because e  0, Note that Ω is a non-empty (because e  0) open set.
We claim that no collateral equilibrium from any endowment proﬁle in Ω
can be Pareto optimal. To see this, ﬁx (e1,...,eN)Ω. In view of Theorem
3, every Pareto optimal collateral equilibrium is Walrasian, so it suﬃces to
show that if hp,(xi)i is a Walrasian equilibrium from the endowment proﬁle
(e1,...,eN) then the consumption allocation (xi) cannot be supported in a
collateral equilibrium. To see this, note that our construction guarantees that
p·e1 ∈ [α,α0], p1·x1
1 ≤ βp·e1 and p1·e1
1 > βp·e1, whence p1·x1
1 < p1·e1
1. Because
utility functions are smooth and consumptions (xi
1) are interrior, state 1
prices in any collateral equilibrium and in any Walrasian equilibrium must
be collinear with marginal rates of substitution, so it follows from Theorem
6 that the consumption allocation (xi)i cannot be supported in a collateral
equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 8 Suppose each consumer is a net saver. For ` =
1,...,L let B` = (B`1,...,B`S;δ0`) be the security pool which is collater-
alized by one unit of the commodity 0` and for which the s tranche B`s
promises to deliver in state s the value of what one unit of commodity 0`





ps · Fs(δ0`) if σ = s
0 if σ 6= s
59Deﬁne prices for commoditiesand tranches as follows:
p0` = ˜ p0` +
X
s
˜ ps · Fs(δ0`)
ps` = ˜ ps`
Q
`s = ps · Fs(δ0`) (12)
For each consumer i and each state s deﬁne
r
i









Note that this quantity could be positive, negative or zero. For each consumer





























We claim hp,,Q,(xi,Φi,Ψi)i is an equilibrium for the economy E =
h(ei,ui),(F`)i.
To see this note ﬁrst that deliveries on tranches coincide with promises:
this follows immediately from the deﬁnitions. Moreover, for each consumer
i the plan (xi,Φi,Ψi) is in consumer i’s collateral budget set B(p,Q;ei):
this follows immediately by substituting the deﬁnitions of prices (12) and of
portfolios (13) into the Walrasian budget constraints.17 We assert that, for
each i, all consumption plans that that can be ﬁnanced by purchases and
sales of security pools are in the Walrasian budget set BW(˜ p;ei). To see this,
suppose (ˆ xi, ˆ ϕi, ˆ Φi, ˆ Ψi) is in consumer i’s budget set B(p,Q;ei). The date 0
17We do not assert that every consumption plan in the Walrasian budget sets can be
ﬁnanced by appropriate portfolios of security purchases and sales – and in general, this is
not so – but only that these particular consumption plans can be so ﬁnanced.
60and state s budget constraints are
p0 · ˆ x0 + Q · ˆ Φ ≤ p0 · e0 + Q · ˆ Ψ
ps · ˆ xs + Del(ˆ Φ;s,p) ≤ ps · es + ps · Fs(ˆ x0)
+ Del(ˆ Ψ;s,p)
Substituting the deﬁnitions of spot prices and security deliveries, summing
and doing some algebra yields
˜ p0 · ˆ x0 +
X
˜ ps · ˆ xs ≤ ˜ p0 · e0 +
X
˜ ps · es
which is the Walrasian budget constraint.
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